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A wave of populism has swept across the world in recent years. This new populism cuts 
across the political spectrum, representing both the left and the right, from the victories of 
Podemos in Spain and Syriza in Greece on the left, to the rise of Donald Trump in the US, 
Brexit in the UK and Marine LePen in France on the right. What these movements share, 
despite their diversity, is their mobilization of disenchanted electorates, fed up with the 
political establishment. 
 
Against the backdrop of the new populism, this paper takes a closer look at the role of anger 
in media coverage of Trump’s inauguration. The paper suggests that Trump’s rise heralds a 
shift in prevailing “emotional regime” (Reddy, 2001) towards what I will refer to as “angry 
populism.” Angry populism – embodied by Trump - is based on a rhetoric which seeks broad 
appeal through the deliberate expression of anger. Adopted as an interpretive framework in 
media coverage, it suggests that the anger of Trump, his supporters and his opponents is both 
salient and relevant to political life.  
 
Theorizing populism and political anger  
The changes in the emotional regime charted here should, first of all, be understood in the 
context of contemporary forms of populism. As a political project, populism tends to be 
premised on the mobilization of the people around an opposition to shared enemies (Laclau, 
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2005, see also Gerbaudo, this issue). Contemporary populisms are based on discursively 
generating collective identities based on oppositions between “the pure people” and “the 
corrupt elite” and usually involve affective allegiances to a charismatic leader (Mudde and 
Kaltwasser, 2012:7, Mudde 2007: 23). Because of the structuring role of such oppositions, 
populist identities are often exclusionary (Laclau 2005: 195).  
 
For the purposes of this piece, I focus on the right-wing forms of populism that Trump 
exemplifies, which frequently draw on such exclusionary solidarities to target resentment at 
the most vulnerable members of society, including immigrants and ethnic minorities (see Ost, 
2006). As such, Trump’s appeal is organized around a particular negative affective 
constellation representing coalescence of longer-standing practices and trends. Yet Trump’s 
appeal also appears to be distinctive – and distinctively angry; premised on the discursive 
construction of shared grievances. First, Trump’s electoral victory has been widely connected 
to broader patterns of economic anger. The prominent economist Ann Pettifour (2017) is one 
of many observers to link the election result to the economic consequences of globalization. 
She has argued that it should be understood as part of a global pattern of response: “In a 
‘counter-movement’ to globalisation and recognising the failure of democratic governments 
to protect societies from the depredations of self-regulating markets, [these societies] have 
reacted by electing “strong men” (and women) that do offer protection. Donald Trump posed 
as a strong protector, and won the support of those Americans ‘left behind’ by globalisation“ 
(Pettifour, 2017: 53). Secondly, Inglehart and Norris (2016), in their analysis of cross-
national survey data, argue that support for Trump is the result of a “cultural backlash”: It is a 
reaction “by once-predominant sectors of the population to progressive value change” – 
particularly salient among older, white male, religious, and less educated parts of the 
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population (Inglehart and Norris, 2016: 3). This “cultural backlash” thesis also casts votes for 
Trump as a vote made in anger, if for slightly different reasons. What these theories share is 
the idea that the decision to vote for Trump arises from forms of reactionary anger, borne out 
of longer-standing exclusion from privilege, whether economic or cultural.  
 
This suggests that theorising anger is vital to understanding Trump’s distinctive brand of 
populism. In focusing on anger, this paper is part of a larger project of taking seriously the 
role of emotion in mediated politics. This goes against the grain of much scholarship in 
political communication and media studies (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2013). The liberal democratic 
approach which prevails in Western democracies has tended to view emotion as anathema to 
good citizenship (Pantti, 2010). The ideal citizen, according to this view, should be rational, 
impartial and dispassionate (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2013). As a result, scholarship on politics, 
media and their relationship has tended to neglect the role of emotion in shaping political life.  
 
Anger has been a particular target of this dismissal. Philosophers since the Stoics have 
viewed the “civilized life as one that avoids anger” (Holmes, 2004: 127). For Lyman (2004: 
134), the “claim that ‘reason should be in control of the emotions’ should be treated as an 
ideology designed to silence angry speech.” Anger has been seen as a dangerous emotion 
that, because of its intensity and the challenge of controlling it, jeopardises the social order 
and leads to violence (Lyman, 2004: 133). This view of anger has made it difficult to open up 
a nuanced debate about its role in political life – one which takes seriously its mobilising 
power and its consequences for public debate. Here, I want to make the case that 
understanding the circulation of anger in public discourse around the rise of Trump is, in fact, 
vital to understanding the phenomenon. 
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Anger is interesting in part because it is a potentially political emotion (Lyman, 1981: 61; 
Lyman, 2004). It has been recognised in social theory as a reaction to injustice, and therefore 
inherently relational (Holmes, 2004). Aristotle, in his Rhetoric, defined anger as “an impulse, 
accompanied by pain, to a conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight directed without 
justification towards what concerns oneself or towards what concerns one’s friends” (1968: 
1382–3). Similarly, for the pragmatist philosopher John Dewey, we “only think we are angry 
because an outside observer describes our conduct in that way, in an attempt to assign 
responsibility for an action” (Dewey, 1983; cited in Ross, 2013: 19). Though anger is in the 
first instance an individual emotion, it comes to matter politically when it is articulated by 
collectives, usually towards a shared objective of addressing an injustice.  
 
The role of anger in social movements has become a matter of interest in recent years, as 
scholars studying oppositional and marginalised groups have begun to recognise anger as an 
important resource of collective mobilization and empowerment. Deborah Gould (e.g. 2010; 
2012) has studied the role of anger in queer and feminist movements. For her, the very act of 
labelling emotions forms the basis for political empowerment – as when lesbians “feeling 
bad” collectively relabelled their emotion as anger (Gould, 2012).  By naming and 
articulating the negative affect of “feeling bad” about the consequences of patriarchy as 
“anger,” it becomes a shared and public emotion which empowers the angry group to take 
action. This work recognises that anger can be a particularly useful resource for oppositional 
political life (see also Holmes, 2004), and that it is readily recognised as an expression of 
collective injustice. At the same time - and precisely because of the association of the 
expression of anger with the collective activities of disempowered groups, often organised 
against dominant power formations, anger has also always been understood as a dangerous 
emotion that requires management and control (Nussbaum, 2016). 
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However, political anger is not reserved for the actions of marginalised groups or social 
movements. Instead, grievances and disaffection should rightly be understood as permanent 
features of political life (Oberschall, 1973: 298). Anger, therefore, must not only be seen as a 
destructive emotion in political life. Instead, it also serves a productive role, insofar as it 
generates bonds of emotional solidarity and forms the basis for collective action. As Ost 
(2006) puts it in the opening of his book, The defeat of solidarity: Anger and politics in 
postcommunist Europe: 
 
Anger, solidarity and democracy have traditionally gone together. Democracy has 
usually been advanced when people angry about their exclusion from wealth and 
power join together in solidarity. This does not mean just mass demonstrations or 
disruptive action. From New Deal America to Keynesian Western Europe, liberal and 
socialist parties resuscitated democracy in the West by organising the anger of those 
long deprived of social protection. (Ost, 2006 :1)  
Anger has always been central to the strategic appeals of mainstream political parties, and 
should be recognized as a key ideological resource: 
Politics does not become angry only when non-elites shout. Anger is built into politics 
through the everyday activities of political parties, which continually both stoke and 
mobilize anger in order to gain and maintain support (Ost, 2004: 229).  
There are two key reasons why anger is so important to the appeals of mainstream politics, 
according to Ost (2004). First of all, there is widespread anger because of economic 
inequalities, and capturing “economic anger” is central to popular appeal, particularly 
successfully harnessed by illiberal populist political actors (Ost, 2006: 9). Secondly, political 
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parties need to cultivate solidarity to maintain their base: “This requires creating an emotional 
connection with supporters, the establishment of an ‘us’ against the ‘them’ of other parties, 
an emotional bond that can best be maintained when the other is cast negatively as an object 
of aversion” (Ost, 2004: 229). For political parties and the politicians who represent them, 
anger must be organised, channelled and harnessed in particular ways, and the organisation of 
anger is vital to the construction of political narrative.  
 
The context for angry populism  
However, the current mobilisation of anger merits analysis as a distinctive formation. This 
theme has been picked up by journalistic and scholarly observers, to explain both the anger of 
Trump voters and of Trump himself. It was a prominent refrain in journalists’ attempts at 
making sense of Trump’s appeal to voters disenchanted with the political process. Cilizza 
(2017) explained Trump’s rise in the Washington Post with reference to polling data. He 
argued that it should be understood as the result of a confluence of circumstances, including 
the hollowing out of the economy, the loss of faith in institutions, unrest within the 
Republican Party and anger with the federal government. Similarly, an Atlantic article linked 
Trump’s ascent to divisions in the Republican Party, powerfully embodied in the Tea Party 
movement: “Was it any wonder, then, that a candidate came along whose anger was even 
more consuming and less constructive, whose disregard for political norms was even more 
flamboyant, whose appeals to racial resentment were even more overt, whose disregard for 
fact and fondness for conspiracy was even more pronounced?” (Ball, 2016).  
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These observations reflect the broader resonance of anger as a political resource for the 
projects of populist politicians. Writing in the New Yorker about Trump’s first 100 days in 
office, David Remnick (2017: 20) described Trump’s ascent as part of a broader global trend 
of a rebellion against liberal democracy, linking it to anger:  
The Trump presidency represents a rebellion against liberalism itself – an angry 
assault on the advances of groups of people who have experienced profound, if fitful, 
empowerment over the past half century. There is nothing about Trump’s public 
pronouncements that indicates that he has welcomed these moral advances; his 
language, his tone, his personal behavior, and his policies all suggest, and foster, a 
politics of resentment. It is the Other – the ethnic minority, the immigrant – who has 
closed your factory, taken your job, threatened your safety. 
Such observations highlight not only the prominence of an emotional politics of anger in 
contemporary politics, but also Trump’s ability to tap into that anger (see Hochschild, 2016). 
 
Angry populism and a changing emotional regime 
Even if much of the analysis of the rise of Trump has been based on observations about 
distinctive cultural, historical and economic circumstances in the United States, there is 
reason to think that these trends may reflect broader developments. The post-colonial writer 
Pankaj Mishra (2017) has suggested that we may be seeing the rise of a global “age of 
anger,” fuelled by disenchantment with the ability of political institutions to effect social 
change. The argument around the emergence of an “age of anger” suggests a change in the 
ways we perform our emotions in public, centrally tied to political practices inside and 
outside – as well as against - institutions of governance. For the historian William Reddy 
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(2001), we need to see practices of governance as driven in part by the way we speak about 
emotions in public. The expression of emotion, or “emotives” constitute “a type of speech 
act…which both describes… and changes… the world, because emotional expression has an 
exploratory and a self-altering effect on the activated thought material of emotion” (2001: 
128). He introduces the term “emotional regime” to refer to the “set of normative emotions 
and the official rituals, practices, and ‘emotives’ that express and inculcate them; a necessary 
underpinning of any stable political regime” (Reddy, 2001: 129).  
 
If emotional regimes coalesce through the public expression of emotives, the media play a 
key role in facilitating their emergence and their change (see also Pantti and Wahl-Jorgensen, 
2011). By studying changes in the use of emotional language in media coverage of a 
comparable event over time (and presidential administrations), we can therefore trace 
changes in the emotional regime. In this case, I am studying shifting emotional regimes by 
looking at expressions of anger in post-election and inauguration coverage of Obama’s first 
election and inauguration in 2009, as well as Trump’s election and inauguration in 2017. In 
taking this approach, I am following the lead of journalism historians who have looked at 
changes in coverage of, for example, the President’s State of the Union address (Schudson, 
1982) and Thanksgiving (Brennen, 2008) to understand transformations in journalistic 
practice. The purpose of my analysis, however, is not to offer a detailed historical exploration 
of emotional regimes, but rather to provide a snapshot of a particular critical moment of 
change, represented by the election of Trump. Such an analysis cannot establish whether 
Trump’s rise of represents a unique emotional regime. But it can point to shifts in the relative 
prominence of particular emotions, and highlight what this tells us about horizons for public 
discourse and political change. In this context, it is worthwhile noting that the populist anger 
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of Donald Trump cannot be simply understood as constructed through the discourses of 
mainstream media, but rather as emerging within a hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2013). 
Trump, like other populist politicians, has been highly successful at mobilising support 
through his use of Twitter (Engesser et al., 2017), and his tweets have, in turn, attracted 
extensive media coverage. The increasing prominence of social media shapes not just the 
content of mainstream media, but also their affective style. According to a number of 
observers, the affordances of Twitter facilitate a discursive climate which is more extreme, 
divisive and polarised (Shepherd et al., 2015). Trump appears to be a beneficiary of this 
affective shift by crafting his charged messages on Twitter in a way that spills over into 
mainstream media (Karpf, 2017).  
  
Here, I will suggest that the ascent of Trump is a reflection of a shift towards an emotional 
regime of “angry populism” – a rhetoric which seeks broad appeal through the deliberate 
expression of anger and which feeds a journalistic narrative that understands anger as central 
to political life. My findings indicate that this anger is sometimes directed at specific targets, 
including the political establishment and other cultural and economic elites, women, 
migrants, ethnic minorities and anyone perceived as a threat to American interests (see also 
Newmyer, 2017).  At other times, however, the anger does not have a target, but instead 
seems to be a more diffuse and ill-defined– a form of anger which is politically consequential 
in its own right. 
 
Studying the rise of angry populism 
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To illustrate this emerging emotional regime, I have studied the occurrence of the phrases 
“anger” and “angry” in the period between Trump’s election in November 2016, and the day 
following his inauguration in January 2017, contrasting it with the period between Obama’s 
first election victory in November 2008, and his first inauguration in January 2009. I have 
then taken a closer look, through a qualitative textual analysis, at the more manageable 
sample of the day following the inauguration for each of the two presidents.  
 
I have chosen to focus on this particular period to avoid tapping into anger surrounding 
conflicts associated with the campaign, instead focusing the language of anger surrounding 
the election and inauguration.  This period is critical in both establishing and contesting the 
reputation, vision and public image of a new president (Mansch, 2005). Inaugurations seek to 
cement the dominant narrative around the president. They are mediated public rituals 
building consensus around the spectacle of affirming the new president and the shared values 
he or she represents (Bajc, 2007; Bormann, 1982; Kertzer, 1989). They represent moments 
when the nation is often represented as coming together, and divisions set aside. This makes 
the study of anger in inauguration coverage all the more interesting: If anger is viewed as an 
uncontrollable and dangerous emotion, it is anathema to the ideological consensus of the 
inauguration ritual where we might expect it to be largely suppressed or invisible (Beasley, 
2001). At the same time, the inauguration coverage also frames the presidency by providing 
an interpretive context for understanding key debates surrounding the new president, and 
therefore provides a sense of the “emotional regime” (Reddy, 2001) s/he embodies. 
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 Using Nexis UK, I selected US newspapers and newswires, and searched for major mentions 
of Trump (Nov 6, 2016-Jan 21, 2017) and Obama (Nov 4 2008-Jan 21, 2009), and mentions 
of “anger” or “angry” anywhere in the text. This basic quantitative examination does not tell 
us anything about the substance of the coverage of anger, but merely detects the presence of 
this particular emotion word, or its correlate, angry. This, however, provides a useful 
indication of the relative salience of anger in mediated debates over the two candidates. I 
should note that the analysis deliberately steers clear of examining similar or related emotion 
words such as “indignation,” “fury” or “frustration.” The reason for this decision is to 
maintain a clear focus on what are explicitly identified as public articulations of anger as a 
central political emotion.  
 
A clear pattern emerges from this analysis: Following his election and up until the day after 
Trump’s inauguration, there were 3828 stories using the terms “anger” or “angry,” contrasted 
with 1449 for Obama. This gives an indication that anger was much more salient in post-
election coverage of Trump than following Obama’s first presidential victory. If we then look 
at the shorter time period of the inauguration and the day after in each of the two cases, we 
get a smaller and more manageable sample of the role of anger at this critical moment of 
establishing the interpretive framework through which the presidency is understood. To 
locate such a sample, I repeated the search detailed above, adding “inauguration” as a search 
term anywhere in the text, looking only at the period of January 20-21, 2009 for Obama, and 
January 20-21, 2017, for Trump. For Obama, the search yielded a total of 47 relevant stories, 
whereas for Trump, there were almost twice as many – 90.i  
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To better understand how this smaller sample constructed anger, I looked, first of all, at the 
target of anger across all the stories: That is to say, at what or whom is the anger directed? 
This provides us with a sense of how the anger is explained – and, in some cases, legitimated. 
If anger is a way of addressing a shared sense of injustice, the nature of the injustice matters 
hugely to the framing and interpretation of the anger. The table below shows the targets of 
the anger in the respective inauguration stories. I have included all instances accounting for 
more than 7% of references to the targets of anger.  
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Table 1: Targets of anger in coverage of Obama’s first inauguration (2009) and Trump’s 
inauguration (2017) 
Obama inauguration (n=47) Trump inauguration (n=90) 
Target Percentage (raw figure) Target Percentage (raw figure) 
Historical racism 19.1% (n=9) Donald Trump 53.3% (n=48) 
Overcrowding at 
inauguration: 
17.0% (n=8) Unspecified anger 20% (n=18) 
War in Gaza: 10.6% (n=5) The economy 10% (n=9) 
George W. Bush 8.5% (n=4) Washington establishment 7.8% (n=7) 
Delay in attorney general 
appointment 
8.5% (n=4)   
 
When anger was referenced in coverage of Obama’s inauguration, this was almost never 
directed at Obama. Instead, the most frequent mention of anger was as a response to the 
historical experience of racism among African-Americans, who were celebrating the Obama 
victory as an opportunity for overcoming racist discrimination. Coverage of anger in the 
context of Obama’s inauguration tells the story of a journey from anger to happiness and 
hope, represented by the historic rise of the first African-American US president.  
 
By contrast, the anger expressed in coverage of Trump’s inauguration overwhelmingly 
targeted Trump himself. This was true for more than half of all references to anger in the 
sample, and was based on extensive coverage of protesters gathering for the inauguration 
itself, as well as the Women’s March on the day following the inauguration. Trump’s 
opponents represented the majority (55.5%) of the subjects of anger – those represented as 
angry in stories. If we look more closely at these subjects of anger in the case of the Trump 
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inauguration, what is particularly interesting is the relatively small number of different types 
of actors accounting for the vast majority: Trump, his oppponents and his supporters account 
for more than 90% of angry actors.  
 
Table 2: Subjects of anger in coverage of Trump inauguration 
Subject of anger Percentage (raw figures) 
Opponents of Trump/Demonstrators 55.5% (n=50) 
Trump 23.3% (n=21) 
Supporters of Trump 13.3% (n=12) 
Other 7.8%  (n=7) 
 
This is in sharp contrast to the Obama inauguration coverage, where the subjects of anger are 
identified as representing a wide variety of actor types – to mention just a few, they include 
Kenyan citizens, Gaza activists, African-American community leaders, domestic politicians, 
and Bush supporters. This also reflects the wide variety of targets of anger in the case of the 
Obama inauguration. It suggests that discord and conflict have an inevitable place in 
narratives of political events, and that Obama’s inauguration provided the opportunity for 
reflection on a wide variety of long-standing political grievances.  
 
In many of the stories on the Trump inauguration, the anger of the protesters was described as 
energising a new social movement, and frequently legitimized with reference to the substance 
of their grievances. A widely syndicated Associated Press article observed that “Trump's call 
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for restrictive immigration measures, religious screening of immigrants and his caustic 
campaign rhetoric about women and minorities angered millions.”  
 
Trump’s supporters, however, were also described as angry, accounting for 13.3% of the 
subjects of anger. The anger of Trump supporters – usually directed at the Washington 
establishment as well as a decline in economic opportunities - was used to explain their 
voting decisions, as in this Associated Press news story: 
Trump's victory underscored that for many Americans, the recovery from the Great 
Recession has come slowly or not at all. His campaign tapped into seething anger in 
working class communities, particularly in the Midwest, that have watched factories 
shuttered and the certainty of a middle class life wiped away.  
Expressions of anger at the Washington establishment was another common target, 
accounting for 7.8% of references – consistent with understandings of populism as oriented 
around an opposition between “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite” (Mudde, 2007). It 
was most prominent in coverage of Trump’s inaugural speech, as in this report from the Los 
Angeles Times:  
His 16-minute speech -- the shortest since President Carter's inaugural in 1977 -- 
lacked specific policy. In its place was a sense of anger at what he defined as a ruling 
political class that had raided America for its own benefit.  
However, what is perhaps most striking about the construction of anger in stories about 
Trump’s inauguration is that a very high number of references to anger – 20% - did not 
identify a target. As the literature on anger suggests, it is highly unusual for anger, as 
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expressed in political coverage, not to have a target. Rather, anger normally requires a target 
for it to matter politically (Pantti and Wahl-Jorgensen, 2011). By contrast, in stories about 
Trump’s inauguration, anger appeared to become newsworthy in its own right. And in the 
vast majority of cases, this unspecified anger was that of Trump himself:  
The 16-minute inaugural address that President Trump delivered was Trumpism 
distilled to its raw essence: angry, blunt-spoken and deeply aggrieved. (Los Angeles 
Times, editorial) 
Donald John Trump intends to govern as the same fiercely angry man who inspired 
the discontented but aroused the worries and fears of so many other Americans. (E. J. 
Dionne, syndicated column) 
Describing anger as having a particular target both explains the anger and contributes to 
legitimizing it. By contrast, the unspecified anger of Trump and his supporters suggests that 
they are angry for no particular reason or cause.  Instead, the image that emerges from the 
media coverage is that anger is essential to their identity and their world view. This 
essentialising of anger is central to understanding the place of angry populism as the 
emotional regime of the Trump Era: It suggests that the particular brand of exclusionary 
populism cultivated by Trump depends on the performance of anger as a way of dramatising 
grievances. Analysts suggested that Trump appealed to voters in large part because he saw 
the utility [AK1]of a new and angrier form of political discourse. As CNN noted in an 
inauguration update: 
Donald J Trump identified, long before anyone else did, the anger and desire for 
change that millions of Americans craved. He addressed that in frank, blunt terms that 
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deeply resonated with millions who were fed up with Washington's political class and 
felt left behind in the globalizing economy. 
Through his astute reading of the Zeitgeist, Trump became an emotional performer, acting as 
the advocate of the people and the impersonator of their anger. His anger mattered because it 
became a political force in its own right. As Michael Wolff wrote in a Hollywood Reporter 
column: 
Even if it is a teleprompter speech - an unfortunate concession to liberal manners - the 
determination or, if you will, truculence, or golf face, angry and pissed off, is written 
in, or cemented, as he practices it. […] Trump, shoulders hunched, arms swinging, 
brow furled, lips pursed, is the medium of his message.  
The widespread emphasis on Trump’s performative anger - and his appeal to an aggrieved 
public through this anger – alongside the interest in the anger of protesters and opponents – 
has had significant consequences in shaping public debate over the presidency. It suggests the 
salience of angry populism, implying that anger is a viable interpretive framework for 
understanding political discourse and its performance, along with the motivations of political 
actors. More than that, Trump’s populism works because of the anger it expresses: Anger is 
foundational to his appeal and his political project. But it also appears to be what we might 
call an umbrella emotion; one which covers a wide variety of grievances and disaffections.  
 
What is also important to note is that not all anger is created equal: Whereas the media 
coverage that the anger of Trump’s supporters and opponents alike is caused by legitimate 
grievances, and might give rise to new forms of solidarity – embodied, for example, by the 
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positivity of protesters – the anger of Trump himself is largely viewed as opportunistic, 
illiberal and dangerous. As the Massachussets Telegram and Gazette reported:  
Carol Sarafconn, a member of Agudat Achim, said the past year frightened her as she 
believed anger and hate took center stage and bigotry and intolerance became the 
norm. 
“It frightens me that the intuitions I treasure are criticized and scrapped,” Ms. 
Sarafconn said. “…When social contracts are weakened, anti-Semitism isn’t that far 
behind. When hate and anger become acceptable, anti-Semitism does, too. 
What this implies is that Trump’s populist anger is dangerous not, as political theorists might 
have it, it is incontrollable or violent, but because it fosters other negative feelings (bigotry, 
intolerance, hate) which are incommensurate with democracy (see also Ott, 2017; Cilizza, 
2017). This, indeed, might be another reason why Trump’s anger is newsworthy in and of 
itself: It is seen to be one which closes down constructive debate and invites in fascism 
through the back door. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have made the case for the importance of considering emotion as a factor in 
mediated politics. In particular, I have proposed that we need to have a careful look at the 
role of anger as a mobilising emotion in explaining the rise of Trump. I have demonstrated a 
shift in the “emotional regime,” represented by media discourses following Trump’s 
inauguration, comparing them to coverage of Obama’s first swearing in. In particular, I have 
argued that media coverage suggests a shift towards an emotional regime of angry populism. 
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This emotional regime renders anger a viable framework for interpreting political life, and 
suggests that its performance is essential to the brand of populism represented by Trump. 
Given the prominence of anger in contemporary politics, then, I have sought to sketch out 
some of the complexities of expressions of anger: I have suggested that it is not just a tool of 
political opportunists like Trump. The anger of Trump supporters as well as protesters against 
him is given voice and represented as legitimate and pertinent. 
 
Even if anger has long been denounced as a negative and dangerous emotion, it is also 
important to consider the ways in which protesters against Trump are seen to view it as 
positive and mobilising. But this alone does not offer a way out of angry populism. It may be 
helpful to look at examples of contexts where related emotional regimes – like those of Geert 
Wilders in the Netherlands and Marine Le Pen in France – have been defeated by appeals to 
more inclusive solidarities. Such examples remind us that collective and political emotions 
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